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STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (Korematsu Center) is 
a non-profit organization based at Seattle University School of Law that works to 
advance justice through research, advocacy, and education. Inspired by the legacy 
of Fred Korematsu, who defied the military orders during World War II that 
ultimately led to the incarceration of more than 110,000 Japanese Americans, the 
Korematsu Center works to advance social justice for all. It has a special interest in 
examining and eradicating the subtle ways that discrimination operates in our 
social structures. The Korematsu Center does not, in this brief or otherwise, 
represent the official views of Seattle University. 
INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Half a century ago, Congress passed the Fair Housing Act (FHA) as Title 
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2012).  Passage of 
the FHA was spurred in part by the Kerner Commission Report,2 which identified 
residential segregation and unequal housing as significant causes of social unrest at 
the time. Texas Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
                                           
1 Amicus certifies that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c)(5), 
no party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any party or 
party’s counsel contribute money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting 
this brief. No person—other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel—
contributed money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief. 
2 The Commission was established by President Lyndon Johnson by Exec. Order 
No. 11365, 3 C.F.R. 675 (1966–1970 Comp). 
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__ US __, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2516 (2015) (citing Rep. of the Nat’l Advisory Comm’n 
on Civ. Disorders at 1 (1968) [hereinafter Kerner Comm’n Rep.]). The Kerner 
Commission concluded that the United States was “moving toward two societies, 
one black, one white—separate and unequal.” Id. (quoting Kerner Comm’n Rep. at 
1). Based on its findings, the Kerner Commission recommended a comprehensive, 
national fair housing law to address the segregation of communities across the 
country. Id.  Shortly thereafter, the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
reinforced the need to address the state of civil rights in the United States.  Id. 
Congress passed the Fair Housing Act in April, 1968, in an attempt to address 
discrimination in housing “on the basis of ‘race, color, religion, or national 
origin.’”3 Id. (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 804, 82 Stat. 
83).  
Twenty years after its passage, Congress amended the Act to include 
“familial status”4 as a prohibited category of discrimination, addressing two studies 
sponsored by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD), which found that policies prohibiting children were used as a pretext to 
discriminate on the basis of race. Tim Iglesias, Moving Beyond Two–Person–Per–
                                           
3 The FHA was amended in 1974 to include sex as a protected class. Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974).  
4 “Familial status” is defined as a household with one or more people under the age 
of eighteen (18) living with a parent or guardian. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(k). 
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Bedroom: Revitalizing Application of the Federal Fair Housing Act to Private 
Residential Occupancy Standards, 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 619, 628 (2012). 
The recent judicial recognition of disparate impact liability under the FHA 
furthers Congressional intent to address housing discrimination, as “[i]t permits 
plaintiffs to counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape 
easy classification as disparate treatment. In this way disparate-impact liability 
may prevent segregated housing patterns that might otherwise result from covert 
and illicit stereotyping.” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2522. 
In an effort to aid this Court’s consideration of the potentially far-reaching 
impact of this case, amicus first places occupancy standards in historical context to 
demonstrate that for the past 150 years they have disproportionately affected 
families of color. Amicus then explains that occupancy standards, like the one here, 
continue to have the same discriminatory effect. Second, amicus argues that 
disparate impact cases—where more subtle forms of discrimination are at play, 
id.—warrant the deterrent influence of punitive damages awards.  
ARGUMENT 
I. OCCUPANCY RESTRICTIONS REDUCE ACCESS TO HOUSING 
FOR FAMILIES OF COLOR. 
 Occupancy Restrictions Were Historically Used to Exclude 
Communities of Color from Housing.  
Since their inception, occupancy standards—typically a limit on the number 
of occupants in any given unit—have had a detrimental effect on marginalized 
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communities. The earliest occupancy standards in the United States targeted 
immigrant groups, whom the white members of the community often perceived as 
immoral and unsanitary. In 1870, the City of San Francisco passed the first 
occupancy law, the Lodging House Ordinance or cubic air law, at the behest of the 
Anti-Coolie Association. Ellen Pader, Housing Occupancy Standards: Inscribing 
Ethnicity and Family Relations on the Land, 19 J. Architectural & Plan. Res. 300, 
308 (2002) [hereinafter Pader, Housing Occupancy Standards]; Charles J. 
McClain, In Search of Equality: The Chinese Struggle Against Discrimination in 
Nineteenth-Century America 45 (1994). The law required a minimum of 500 cubic 
feet of air space per person in lodging houses, violation of which could result in 
criminal fines of up to $500 or imprisonment of up to 90 days. Elmer Clarence 
Sandmeyer, The Anti-Chinese Movement in California 51 (1973). 
Proponents of the cubic air law grounded their call for legislation in 
explicitly racist ideas, characterizing Chinese immigrants as “moral leper[s],” and 
propagating a fear of the spread of contagious disease due to the crowded 
conditions and general undesirability that such proponents ascribed to the Chinese 
community. Sandmeyer, supra, at 51. The law was aimed less at protecting public 
health than at capitulating to racial animus and deterring Chinese immigrants from 
settling or remaining in the area. McClain, supra, at 45-46. Though the criminal 
penalties could be assessed against both landlords and tenants, the law was almost 
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exclusively enforced against renters in the Chinatown neighborhood of San 
Francisco, where residents had no other option but to share small spaces. Pader, 
Housing Occupancy Standards, supra, at 308; McClain, supra, at 65-66.  
Just a few years later, in 1879, New York City enacted a similar occupancy 
standard, requiring at least 600 cubic feet of air space per person. Pader, Housing 
Occupancy Standards, supra, at 308. In contrast to the campaign in San Francisco, 
advocates of the law in New York highlighted public health as the rationale for 
passing occupancy standards in their community. The reformers advocated for 
“cubic air” as the appropriate measure because they believed in “miasmas,” the 
idea that breathing in one’s own exhaled air could be toxic, and that without 
enough air space people could drown in their own breath. Id. 
However, racial prejudices were also at work in the background, with a 
desire by higher class, white Protestant reformers to cause new, largely Eastern 
European immigrants,5 thought to be genetically inferior, to assimilate and lead 
“moral” lives by imposing a value of physical privacy upon them. Id. at 309. Many 
of the people pushing for housing reforms judged the conditions of the tenements 
in New York City’s Lower East Side to be “emotionally, morally, and physically 
                                           
5 During this period, large numbers of immigrants resided in the tenements in New 
York City’s Lower Eastside neighborhood. The tenements were filled primarily by 
Jewish, Polish, Italian, and Slavic populations that were considered to be ethnically 
non-white. Pader, Housing Occupancy Standards, supra, at 306.  
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unhealthy.” Id. at 306. At that time, most people believed that bad housing 
conditions, including what they considered to be overcrowding, “directly produced 
illness, crime, intemperance, promiscuity, and the breakdown of the family.” Id. 
“In a manner that continues today with occupancy standards, one sector of 
society’s concept of moral living was being insinuated upon people with very 
different belief systems.”6 Id. at 309; cf. Dowell Myers et al., The Changing 
                                           
6 Even in recent history, local governments have enacted occupancy standard 
ordinances as a way to discourage or even make it impossible for unwanted groups 
to reside in those communities. See, e.g., Ellen J. Pader, Space of Hate: Ethnicity, 
Architecture and Housing Discrimination, 54 Rutgers L. Rev. 881, 889 (2002) 
[hereinafter Pader, Space of Hate] (discussing United States v. Town of 
Cicero, Civil Action No. 93-cv-01805 (N.D. Ill. 1993), in which DOJ sued the 
town for discriminatory enforcement of a restrictive occupancy code in a Chicago 
suburb aimed at “achiev[ing] their objective of preventing, or discouraging, 
Hispanic families with children from becoming resident of the Town”, and United 
States v. City of Waukegan, Civil Action No. 96-cv-04996 (N.D. Ill. 1996), where 
the city unsuccessfully attempted to impose occupancy restriction of nuclear 
family plus two relatives to discourage the settlement of new Latino residents); 
Charisse Jones, Crowded Houses Gaining Attention in Suburbs, USA Today, Jan. 
30, 2006, https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/ news/nation/2006-01-30-
overcrowding-suburbs_x.htm (reporting on occupancy ordinances in communities 
around the country targeted at Latino immigrant communities); Stephanie 
McCrummen, Anti-Crowding Law Repealed Latinos Were Focus of Manassas Ban 




.d58a5ab2d6be (reporting on repeal of occupancy ordinance by Virginia city 
targeting Latino community that restricted extended families from living together 
under threat of civil rights lawsuits and federal investigation); c.f. Ave. 6E Inv., 
LLC. V. City of Yuma, Ariz., 818 F.3d 493, 506-07, 513 (9th Cir. 2016) (reversing 
summary judgment for defendants of disparate impact claims where application for 
7 
 
Problem of Overcrowded Housing, 62 J. Am. Plan. Ass’n, 66, 67 (Winter 1996) 
(noting that harms to health associated with overcrowding have long been 
assumed, but never definitively established).  Even so, it was not until 1968 that 
Congress took steps to comprehensively remedy the problem of segregation and 
discrimination in housing by enacting the Fair Housing Act.  
 The Fair Housing Amendments Act Was Enacted to Combat 
Discrimination Against Families and to Address the Use of No 
Children Policies as a Proxy for Racial Discrimination.  
Twenty years after passing the Fair Housing Act, Congress enacted the Fair 
Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA). Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 
(1988). Among other amendments, the FHAA added disability and familial status 
to the list of categories protected against discrimination in housing, and removed 
the $1000 cap on punitive damages. Robert G. Schwemm, Housing Discrimination 
Law and Litigation, § 5.3, at 5-6 (1990). Two studies commissioned by HUD 
supported the decision to add familial status as a protected category. Both 
published in 1980, the studies documented the widespread impact of excluding 
families with children from private rental housing.  See generally, Jane G. Greene 
& Glenda P. Blake, A Study of How Restrictive Rental Practices Affect Families 
with Children (research conducted for Off. of Pol’y Dev. and Res., HUD) (1980) 
                                           
rezoning denied amidst evidence of City’s capitulation to racial animus toward 
Latino residents of neighboring community). 
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(documenting pervasive discrimination against families with children in rental 
housing); Robert W. Marans et al., A Report on Measuring Restrictive Rental 
Practices Affecting Families with Children: A National Survey (prepared for Off. 
of Pol’y Dev. and Res., HUD) (1980) (establishing that families with children have 
more limited housing choices, face longer search times, and higher costs for 
housing).  
These studies also demonstrated that families of color were more likely to be 
impacted by no-children policies. Greene & Blake, supra, at 3 (“minorities were 
the most heavily burdened by serious problems caused by restrictive [no-children] 
rental policies”); Marans et al., supra, at 53 (minority households more likely to be 
renters and therefore more likely to experience effects of no-children policies). 
When the FHAA was enacted, legislators recognized that familial status was 
sometimes used as a “smokescreen” for racial discrimination in housing. 134 
Cong. Rec. H4688 (1988) (remarks of Rep. Dellums); Schwemm, supra, § 11.6(1), 
at 11-86. In enacting the FHAA, Congress understood that discrimination against 
families with children had a disproportionate impact on families of color and 
served to exacerbate racial segregation.7 H.R. Rep. No. 711, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. 
21 (1988).  
                                           
7 Prior to passage of the FHAA, two circuit courts upheld FHA claims on the basis 
of race, relying on evidence that no-children policies had a disparate impact on 
families of color. See Betsey v. Turtle Creek Ass’n, 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 
9 
 
Once landlords were no longer allowed to use no-children policies to 
exclude families, they increasingly turned to facially neutral occupancy standards. 
Although the FHA did not establish national occupancy standards, the law allows 
for “reasonable local, State or Federal restrictions regarding the maximum number 
of occupants permitted to occupy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. §3607(b)(1). Though this 
provision only explicitly addresses legislatively created occupancy standards, it has 
been interpreted to allow for private occupancy restrictions. In 1991, the general 
counsel for HUD, Frank Keating, issued a policy statement regarding the factors 
HUD would consider in evaluating occupancy restrictions by private housing 
providers against claims of discrimination on the basis of familial status. 
Memorandum from HUD General Counsel Frank Keating to all Regional Counsel 
regarding “Fair Housing Enforcement Policy: Occupancy Cases” (Mar. 20, 1991), 
reprinted in Fair Housing Enforcement—Occupancy Standards Notice of 
Statement of Policy 63 Fed. Reg. 70,256 (filed Dec. 18, 1998) [hereinafter Keating 
Memo]. In the memo, Mr. Keating explicitly stated that he did not intend to create 
occupancy policies or requirements, but was providing guidance to his department 
                                           
1984) (holding plaintiffs established prima facie case of discrimination on the basis 
of race where evidence that conversion to all-adult building had a greater adverse 
impact on tenants of color); Halet v. Wend Investment Co., 672 F.2d 1305, 1308-
09, 1311 (9th Cir. 1982) (upholding claim for racial discrimination under FHA 
where evidence that adults-only rental policy had a discriminatory effect on 




for the evaluation of familial status discrimination claims. Id. at 70,256. The 
Keating Memo established two persons per bedroom as a generally acceptable 
occupancy limit under the FHA, but indicated that was not the only factor 
investigators would consider. Id. at 70,256-57. According to the Keating Memo, it 
was the policy of HUD to also consider the size of the bedrooms and the unit as a 
whole, the age of the children, the configuration of the unit, any other physical 
limitations of the housing, applicable state or local law, and any other relevant 
factors.  Id. at 70,257. Keating’s policy statement remained the relevant guidance 
until HUD promulgated regulations related to disparate impact in 2013. See 24 
C.F.R. § 100.500 (Discriminatory effect prohibited); c.f. MHANY Mgmt., Inc. v. 
Cty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 618-19 (2d. Cir. 2016).  
 Occupancy Standards Should Be Closely Scrutinized Due to the 
Discriminatory Impact on Families of Color.  
Studies show that occupancy standards continue to have a disproportionate 
discriminatory effect on families of color due to a variety of economic, 
demographic, and cultural factors. According to studies, the non-Hispanic white 
population is less likely to live in overcrowded conditions than their counterparts 
from communities of color. HUD, Measuring Overcrowding in Housing at 12 
(Sept. 2007), https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/ 
measuring_overcrowding_in_hsg.pdf. Latino and Asian households, particularly 
those whose members are not native-born, are the most likely to live in crowded 
11 
 
housing, with overcrowding most prevalent among the Latino population. Id., at 
12, 17; Myers et al., supra, at 70 (recent immigrants have highest rates of 
overcrowding, and Latino and Asian households as a whole are most 
overcrowded).  
The first reason for this dynamic is that compared to non-Hispanic whites, 
people from other ethnic or racial groups, especially Asians and Latinos, are far 
more likely to live with their families at the early and late stages of the life cycle, 
when they are young and not yet married, and when they are elderly. Iglesias, 
supra, at 649; see Jonathan Vespa et al., U.S. Census Bureau, America’s Families 
and Living Arrangements: 2012 7-8 (August 2013), https://www.census.gov/ 
content/dam/Census/library/publications/2013/demo/p20-570.pdf 
(multigenerational living arrangements more common among Asian, Black and 
Latino households); Gary Painter & Zhou Yu, Immigrants and Housing Markets in 
Mid-Size Metropolitan Areas, 44 Int’l Migration Rev. 442, 468 (2010) (immigrants 
more likely to live in multi-generational households).  
Non-Hispanic whites also have fewer children per household compared with 
other racial groups. African-Americans tend to have slightly more children, while 
Asians, and Latinos have the most children per household. Iglesias, supra, at 649; 
see U.S. Census Bureau, America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2017, 
Table AVG1. Average Number of People Per Household, By Race and Hispanic 
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Origin, Marital Status, Age, And Education of Householder: 2017 (November 
2017), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/demo/ families/cps-2017.html; c.f. 
Painter & Yu, supra, at 455, 458 (immigrants more likely to have children in the 
home). 
Finally, compared with other groups, Latinos and African-Americans have 
higher poverty rates, and are therefore more likely to rent housing and to live in 
smaller units. Iglesias, supra, at 649; Suzanne Maccartney et al., U.S. Census 
Bureau, Poverty Rates for Selected Detailed Race and Hispanic Groups by State 
and Place: 2007-2011 3 (February 2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2013pubs/acsbr11-17.pdf; Measuring Overcrowding in Housing, supra, at 14 
(overcrowding more common among renters). However, when occupancy 
standards prohibit greater numbers of people in a unit, “larger families may be 
priced out of the market or forced to move into run-down neighborhoods with 
larger, less expensive homes and often poorer quality services…this tends to 
segregate neighborhoods by race, ethnicity, and class and be implicated in 
affordability and homelessness problems.” Pader, Housing Occupancy Standards, 
supra, at 303. 
Some scholars have also argued that what is deemed “overcrowding” may 
for some be an expression of cultural values and preferences. “Sharing sleeping 
and other spaces is often part of a cultural emphasis on interdependency as a 
13 
 
personal and political goal, while sleeping alone, and other emphases on physically 
bounded private domestic space, help enculturate a greater emphasis on 
individualism.” Pader, Space of Hate, supra, at 887; cf. Myers et al., supra, at 67 
(“After a century of debate it is still in question whether so-called overcrowding is 
harmful to the people affected, or merely socially distasteful to outsiders who 
observe its presence among others.”). The research supports this conclusion. 
Various studies have documented that, even after controlling for income and 
household size, some households continue to have higher levels of crowding. This 
suggests that some households choose to live in tighter quarters, even when they 
can afford more space. Myers et al., supra, at 72, 81 (noting that higher percentage 
of Asian and Latino households remain overcrowded even at incomes twice the 
median and endorsing the importance of acknowledging differences in cultural 
standards); Measuring Overcrowding in Housing, supra, at 13 (noting that for 
some, overcrowding appears to be a choice rather than a financial necessity).  
 From their inception, there has been a lack of empirical evidence to justify 
the imposition of what are considered “reasonable” occupancy standards. See 
Pader, Housing Occupancy Standards, supra, at 306-12; Myers et al., supra, at 68 
(noting that “there is no basis in the scientific literature for choosing one standard 
of unacceptable crowding over another”). At the same time, there is a wealth of 
evidence demonstrating that families of color are most likely to experience the 
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negative effects of such restrictions, including paying a higher percentage of 
household income, having fewer choices in housing, having little choice in 
neighborhoods, and experiencing higher degrees of segregation. See Pader, 
Housing Occupancy Standards, supra, at 303; Iglesias, supra, at 649 (noting 
“strong disparate impact across racial lines” resulting from occupancy standards). 
As a result, while occupancy restrictions can sometimes serve to protect people 
from substandard living conditions, they should be closely scrutinized due to the 
risk that they will ultimately result in discrimination.  
 In those cases where a plaintiff proves that occupancy standards have caused 
a disparate impact, compensatory damages alone are likely insufficient to remedy 
the discrimination that occurred, and certainly do not deter other housing providers 
from enforcing occupancy standards that would continue to produce a disparate 
impact. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54 (1983) (“The focus [of the common law 
punitive damages standard] is on the character of the tortfeasor’s conduct—
whether it is of the sort that calls for deterrence and punishment over and above 
that provided by compensatory awards.”). The award of punitive damages, 
explicitly contemplated by 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1), is an effective tool for judicial 
enforcement of some of the policy goals that catalyzed passage of the FHAA—
namely, to deter housing providers from using familial status as a “smokescreen”8 
                                           
8 134 Cong. Rec. H4688 (1988) (remarks of Rep. Dellums). 
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for racial discrimination, and to ameliorate patterns of racial segregation. Supra at 
p. 7-10.   
II. AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IS PARTICULARLY 
IMPORTANT IN DISPARATE IMPACT CASES BECAUSE IT 
RECOGNIZES AND DETERS SUBTLE FORMS OF 
DISCRIMINATION. 
A. Punitive Damages Awards in Disparate Impact Cases Signal an 
Important Recognition that Disparate Impact Results from 
Discrimination and Perpetuates Inequality, Just as Disparate 
Treatment Does.  
The discriminatory housing practices defined by the FHA contain language 
the Supreme Court has interpreted to permit disparate impact theories, as the 
statutory “text refers to the consequences of actions and not just to the mindset of 
actors.”  Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2518, 2518-21 (disparate impact 
claims are allowed under the FHA and are consistent with its central purpose of 
eradicating discriminatory practices within the housing sector). As the Supreme 
Court has explicitly recognized, disparate impact liability under the FHA “permits 
plaintiffs to counteract unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that escape 
easy classification as disparate treatment,” preventing “segregated housing patterns 
that might otherwise result from covert and illicit stereotyping.” Id. at 2522.  
The FHA permits plaintiffs to recover punitive damages “if the court finds 
that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to occur.” 42 U.S.C. 
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§ 3613(c)(1).9 The award is governed by the common law punitive damages 
standard, and is a distinct analysis from the underlying liability theory.10 Punitive 
damages may be awarded for a defendant’s “reckless or callous disregard” of a 
plaintiff’s federally protected rights. See, e.g., U.S. v. Tropic Seas, 887 F. Supp. 
1347, 1365 (D. Haw. 1995) (quoting Smith, 461 U.S. at 51 (in a disparate impact 
FHA case, stating that punitive damages may be awarded)). To be entitled to 
punitive damages, a plaintiff need not prove a defendant’s “awareness that it is 
engaging in discrimination.” Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535, 
(1999).11 Further, the conduct itself need not be outrageous to warrant punitive 
                                           
9 42 U.S.C.§ 3602(f) defines discriminatory housing practice as “an act that is 
unlawful under section 3604, 3605, 3606, or 3617 of this title.” 
10 Importantly, whether punitive damages are merited under either the common law 
punitive damages standard or the statutory punitive damages standard of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981a(b)(1) is a different analysis than the underlying liability theory, which may 
or may not require the plaintiff to demonstrate intentional discrimination.  
11 Punitive damages are available under Title VII in cases alleging disparate 
treatment, as in Kolstad. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1); Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 534. As set 
forth above, the FHA permits punitive damages in cases alleging disparate impact. 
42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1). However, the statutory standard governing the award of 
punitive damages in Title VII is virtually identical to the federal common law 
standard that governs punitive damages in FHA cases. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 
1981a(b)(1) (“A complaining party may recover punitive damages under this 
section against a respondent…if the complaining party demonstrates that the 
respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice…with malice or with reckless 
indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.”), with 
Smith, 461 U.S. at 51 (“reckless or callous disregard for the plaintiff's rights, as 
well as intentional violations of federal law, should be sufficient to trigger a jury's 
consideration of the appropriateness of punitive damages”).  
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damages, nor driven by personal animosity or preference. Fountila v. Carter, 571 
F.2d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 1978); see also Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 534-35 (the 
defendant’s conduct itself need not be considered egregious).  
In disparate impact cases, liability is premised on an adequate evidentiary 
showing that a particular facially neutral policy caused a particular discriminatory 
impact. R.I. Comm’n for Human Rights v. Graul, 120 F. Supp. 3d 110, 123-24 (D. 
R.I. 2015).12 A prima facie case creates an inference of discrimination that shifts 
the burden of production to the defendant to show a valid interest served by its 
policy. Id. at 124. Assuming the defendant does not meet its burden,13 the punitive 
damages inquiry allows the fact finder to engage with that inference of 
discrimination. The fact finder has the latitude to consider the defendant’s role with 
respect to the disparate impact—though it may fall short of explicit or intentional 
discrimination—in recognition that disparate impacts may indeed flow from more 
subtle forms of bias. This is precisely the type of “discretionary moral judgment” 
that the punitive damages construct contemplates. Smith, 461 U.S. at 52; see also 
                                           
12 In a disparate impact case of alleged housing discrimination, a prima facie case 
requires “proof that a plaintiff has suffered an injury because a facially neutral 
policy deprives members of a protected group in disproportionate numbers of a 
benefit available to non-members of the group.” Id.  
13 Alternatively, the defendant could meet its burden of production, but the plaintiff 
could then succeed in showing those reasons are pretextual or otherwise not 
legitimate. See id. at 131. 
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id. at 54-55 (“society has an interest in deterring and punishing all intentional or 
reckless invasions of the rights of others” (emphasis in original)).  
B. The General Deterrent Effect of Punitive Damages in Civil Rights 
Litigation Discourages Behavior that Reinforces Systemic Inequality. 
Punitive damages are particularly important in the context of civil rights 
cases alleging disparate impact, because many inequalities are perpetuated through 
facially neutral action, whether governmental or private. “The deterrent function of 
punitive damages operates both to deter the defendant from reoffending—an 
objective known as specific deterrence—and to deter others from committing 
similar tortious acts—general deterrence.” Roseanna Sommers, The Psychology of 
Punishment and the Puzzle of Why Tortfeasor Death Defeats Liability for Punitive 
Damages, 124 Yale L.J. 1295, 1295 (2015) (internal quotations omitted); see 
also Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick Fitzgerald, Punitive Damages and the Supreme 
Court’s Reasonable Relationship Test: Ignoring the Economics of Deterrence, 19 
St. John’s J. Legal Comment. 237, 243 (2005). Law and economics theory teaches 
that a rational defendant will refrain from engaging in unlawful conduct from 
which he or she benefits only when the expected cost of the conduct exceeds the 
expected benefit. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An 
Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 879-82 (1998).  
Because compensatory damages awards are often quite small in fair housing 
cases, punitive damages are necessary to encourage rational decision-making, and 
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thus achieve general deterrence, for at least three reasons. First, punitive damages 
may be necessary to deter more subtle forms of housing discrimination because 
victims of housing discrimination may or may not perceive a facially-neutral 
occupancy standard as constituting a harm, precisely because of its apparent 
neutrality. See Keith Hylton, Reply: Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory 
of Penalties, 87 Geo. L. J. 421, 460-61 (1998). Even if a particular family 
perceived an occupancy standard as a harm, there is little incentive for that family 
to seek to vindicate their rights: the family may lack the resources necessary to 
bring a suit, and the probability of recovery is low, creating a lack of incentive for 
individuals discriminated against and for attorneys to bring these types of suits. Id. 
at 461; Johanna M. Lundgren, Note, A Weakened Enforcement Power: The Fifth 
Circuit Limits Punitive Damages Under the Fair Housing Act in Louisiana Acorn 
Fair Housing v. LeBlanc, 46 Loy. L. Rev. 1325, 1336 (2000)14 (“Punitive damages 
serve the intent of the Fair Housing Act by providing an incentive for private 
                                           
14 The Fifth Circuit in Louisiana Acorn Fair Housing v. LeBlanc held that punitive 
damages in FHA cases were not available unless the fact finder had awarded 
compensatory damages as well. 211 F.3d 298, 301-03 (5th Cir. 2000). However, 
this Court has noted that a “finding of actual damages is not a condition to the 
award of punitive damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1968.” Fountila, 571 F.2d 
at 492 (citing Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1112 n.4 (7th Cir. 1972), aff’d sub 
nom. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974)). And the fact finder here awarded 
compensatory damages, rendering the compensatory-punitive damages link 
announced in LeBlanc inapplicable. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 7 
(Oct. 5, 2017), ECF No. 60 (awarding to FHCW “actual damages of $27,302.”). 
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individuals to bring suit under the Act, an incentive not provided by the possibility 
of compensatory damages because very few cases brought under the Act involve 
significant economic losses.” (citation omitted)); see Marc Galanter & David 
Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 
1393, 1426 (1993) (punitive damages give parties and attorneys an incentive to 
bring suit). 
Second, punitive damages are also necessary in disparate impact fair housing 
cases because compensatory damages alone do not likely fully encapsulate the 
larger societal harm of housing discrimination. Occupancy restrictions that result in 
housing discrimination do not affect just the individuals who sue—the only ones 
who will receive compensatory damages. Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 861 
F.3d 853, 871 (9th Cir. 2017) (compensatory damages are “intended to redress the 
concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful 
conduct.” (citation omitted)). Apart from harm to the plaintiffs, housing 
discrimination affects others similarly situated to the plaintiffs, and society as a 
whole, as it can lead to housing segregation, from which many further 
consequences flow:  
The existence of discrimination based on familial status has 
detrimental consequences for Rhode Island communities, including 
‘condemn[ing] large groups of inhabitants to dwell in segregated 
districts or under depressed living conditions in crowded, unsanitary, 
substandard, and unhealthful accommodations;’ contributing to 
intergroup tension; compromising the public health, safety, and 
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general welfare; and creating substantial burdens on the public 
revenues for the relief of these undesirable effects.  
Graul, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 117-18 (quoting R.I.G.L. § 34-37-1(c)); see also Robert 
G. Schwemm, Compensatory Damages in Federal Fair Housing Cases, 16 Harv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 83, 98 (1981) (“[T]he right to buy or rent a home, free from 
racial discrimination, carries with it the opportunity to find new employment, to 
enroll one’s children in different schools, and many other advantages.”). 
Finally, punitive damages are warranted where the benefits that flow to the 
defendant from the unfair housing practices exceed the value of the harm when 
measured by compensatory damages alone. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and 
Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 32 (1982) 
(“expected liability must be raised to a level that exceeds [a 
defendant’s]…valuation of the cost of avoidance”); Polinsky & Shavell, supra, at 
907-08; see also LeBlanc, 211 F.3d at 306 (King, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with 
the majority’s adoption of a compensatory-punitive link in the FHA, because “the 
behavior exhibited by this defendant has been unlawful for thirty years and is 
reminiscent of the blatant violations challenged shortly after the Act became 
effective. And yet, he emerges from this case with no financial disincentive to 
continue his practices. Nor are other landlords in the community hereby 
discouraged from engaging in similar practices.”); see also Lundgren, supra, at 
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1338 (“violations of housing discrimination law will likely persist as long as racist 
landlords find it financially viable to engage in acts of discrimination”).  
C. Courts Have Already Signaled Approval of Punitive Damages in FHA 
Cases Brought Under Disparate Impact Theories. 
Courts have signaled the availability of punitive damages in FHA cases 
involving disparate impact claims, recognizing that discrimination frequently 
results from facially neutral restrictions. Tropic Seas, 887 F. Supp. at 1360, 1361-
66 (noting that “direct proof of unlawful discrimination is rarely available,” 
denying defendants’ motion on the availability of punitive damages and remanding 
for a trial on punitive damages, while also granting plaintiff-intervenor’s motion 
for summary judgment on claim that an occupancy restriction created a disparate 
impact based on familial status); see also Graul, 120 F. Supp. 3d at 131-32 
(granting summary judgment on liability for disparate impact of occupancy 
restrictions based on familial status, and, even though the parties had not moved on 
damages, noting that punitive damages were available in FHA disparate impact 
cases). 
Knowing that he was violating the FHA, the defendant here continued to 
discriminate against families. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 7-8 (Oct. 
5, 2017), ECF No. 60. Whether the defendant’s conduct was egregious is 
immaterial; all that is necessary for the Court to uphold the award of punitive 
damages is that the defendant engaged in conduct with the perceived risk that he 
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was violating the federally protected rights of the plaintiff. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 
535.15 The very fact that the defendant admitted he was aware that he was violating 
the FHA establishes the requisite mental state necessary for punitive damages. The 
trial court in this case found that “despite knowing that the FHA prohibits 
discrimination against families with children he feels free to restrict occupancy 
because ‘that’s what I wish to do.’” Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 4 
(Oct. 5, 2017), ECF No. 60.16  
                                           
15 Because the common law standard governing punitive damages in FHA cases is 
virtually the same as the statutory standard under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a—even though 
the underlying liability theory might involve either intentional discrimination or 
disparate impact, see supra note 10—courts have borrowed from case law 
interpreting other civil rights statutes in determining whether punitive damages are 
appropriate in FHA cases. See, e.g., Badami v. Flood, 214 F.3d 994, 997 (8th Cir. 
2000) (remanding for trial on punitive damages in a case involving housing 
discrimination based on the plaintiffs’ familial status and instructing that 
“[a]lthough Kolstad concerned punitive damages in a Title VII employment 
discrimination case, and Wade addressed punitive damages in a § 1983 civil rights 
action, we believe the same standard for punitive damages applies in the Fair 
Housing Act context”); see also Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 419, 430-32 (3rd Cir. 
2000) (in a FHA case involving race discrimination, remanding for a trial on 
punitive damages and relying on Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (Title VII) and 
Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3rd Cir. 1965) (§ 1983) in determining the 
district court had erred in failing to give a jury instruction regarding punitive 
damages). 
 
16 It is worth noting that the defendant has a law degree. Findings of Fact and 
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